Effectivity functions and associated game correspondences by Otten, G.J.M. et al.
CBM
R ~~ i
7626 ~- `~ ~~~~` fi
,~, 36 6 J~,~ ~. eF'
~ ~ ~. ``~ ,,' J ~C, ~p-
~~ ~~~~ ~~
5~~00~~ ~,~~~~~ I Qo ho ,~.~ iNiIIINIIIIII~IINIIIIIIIIVIIIIIIIIII
ír~;~,,~,i~,~;;;EFFECTIVITY FUNCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED
CLAIM GAME CORRESPONDENCES
Gert-Jan Otten, Peter Borm,
Ton Storcken, Stef Tijs
FEw 536
~ ~f O
Refereed by Prof.dr. P.H.M. Ruys~~~í-~~~~~i-~~~K
T6~B~~~ iEíiectivity ~.inctions and Associated Claim
Game Correspondences
Gert-Jan Otten, Peter Borm, Ton Storcken ', Stef Tíjs
Tilburg University
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
January, 1992
Abstract
In this paper upper cycle free effectivity functions are implemented by
strategic claim game correspondences. It is shown that these claim game cor-
respondences are tight. Necessary and sufFicient conditions are provided such
that an effectivity function coincides with the a- and Q-effectivity function
corresponding to its associated claim game correspondence. Moreover, given
a preference profile, relations between various solution concepts for effectiv-
ity functions and the associated claim game correspondences are established.
Finally, a process is described to derive a game form from the claim game
correspondence which still yields the same ~-effectivity function.
'This research was supported by a grant from the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven
University1 Introduction and notation
The first who indicated connections between different types of games were von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944). They showed that it was possible to construct a
cooperative game with side payments (or: a game in coalitional form) from a garne iii
strategic form, and conversely. Later, others also established relationships between
cooperative and non-cooperative games (see for example Nash (1950) and Aumann
(1961,1967)).
Borm and Tijs (1992) introduced a`claim' game in strategic form corresponding
to an NTU-game. In the claim game strategies of players can be interpreted as claims
on coalitions and payoffs. Borm and Tijs showed that if the NTU-game is superad-
ditive, imputations and strong core elements of the NTU-game correspond to Pareto
undominated Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria of the associated claim game,
respectively. Along similar lines this paper will establish relations between effectivity
functions, which describe cooperative situations, and game correspondences, describ-
ing non-cooperative situations.
Effectivity functions (Moulin and Peleg (1982)) describe coalitional power in a
society. The interpretation is that if a coalition is effective for a subset of alternatives,
it can force the outcome within that set.
Game correspondences are introduced by Peleg (1984b) as an extension of game forms
(Gibbard (1973)). In a game form the outcome function assigns to every strategy
vector one alternative, while in a game correspondence the outcome function assigns
to each strategy vector a subset of alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 and 3 the necessary definitions are
given. In section 2 we define effectivity functions and modify the notion of the core
of an effectivity function at a given preference profile, to be a collection of subsets of
alternatives rather than only one subset as e.g. in Moulin and Peleg (1982).
Subsequently, section 3 discusses game correspondences and, given a preference
profile formally defines various equilibrium concepts. Moreover, we recall the defini-
tion of the a-effectivity function Eá, and the Q-effectivity function EÁ , associated
with a game correspondence G, as Peleg (1984b).
Section 4 is the central part of the paper. We construct the claim game corre-
1spondence G(E) associated with an upper cycle free effectivity function E and we
show that the a- and ~i-effectivity functions associated with G(E) are identical, i.e.
that the claim game correspondence is tight. We also show that the a-effectivity
function associated with G(E) equals E if and only if E is weakly A-monotonic and
superadditive. Furthermore, section 4 establishes relations between cooperative and
non-cooperative solution corrcepts. Among others it is shown that if E' is superaddi-
tive, the core elements of E at a given preference profile exactly correspond to the
outcomes of strong Nash equilibria of G(E) at that profile.
In section 5 we discuss a process to derive a game form frorn a claim game corre-
spondence in such a way that the a-effectivity function does not change. As a result
of this process we obtain an alternative proof of the fact that, given an effectivity
tuuctio~ I: it is possiblc to construct a gatnc lorm C such ihat Is - l;;' if ancl only
if E is superadditive and A-monotonic (cf. Moulin (1983)).
Notation. Let D be a set. By P(D) we denote the power set, of D, i.e.
P(D) - {C ~ C C D}, and by 2D we denote the set of all non-empty subsets oí
D. So 20 - P(D)`{0}.
A preference relation R on D is a subset of D x D which satisfies
(i) completeness: for all a, 6 E D, (a, b) E R or ( b, a) E R, and
(ii) transitivity: for all a, 6, c E D, if (a, b) E R and (b, c) E R, then (a, c) E R.
We use the notation a R b if (a, b) E R, and a P b if a R b and not b R a.
If A is a set of alternatives, with a, b E A, N a finite set of individuals, and R' a
preference relation on A for all i E N, then a R' 6 is to be interpreted a.s `alterriative
a is at least as good as alternative b according to R". Furthermore, Rs :- (R');ES,
Ps :- (P`);ES, and RN is called a(preference) profile on A.
2 Eífectivity functions
Let A be a finite set of alternatives and let N be the set {1, ..., n}. N is called a
society, members of N are called players or voters, and non-empty subsets of N are
2called coalitions.
Definition 2.1. An effectivity function is a map E : 2N ~ P(2A) such that
(i) E(N) - 2A
(ii) A E E(S) for all S E 2N.
The interpretation of E is as follows: if B E E(S), then S can force the final
decision within the subset B of alternatives. By definition the society N can force
every outcome.
Effectivity functions were introduced by Moulin and Peleg ( 1982), but the idea of
effectiveness of coalitions was already proposed by Rosenthal ( 1972). In the following
definition we collect several properties of effectivity functions whích we use later on.
With the exception of (ii) these properties can all be found in Abdou and Keiding
(1991).
Definition 2.2. Let E: 2N -~ P(2A) be an effectivity function.
(i) E is A-monotoníc if for all S E 2N and all B, B' E 2A with B C B' and
B E E(S), we have B' E E(S).
(ii) E is weakly A-monotonic if for all S E 2N and all B, B' E 2A, with B C B':
if B E E(S), then there exists a partition {S~, ..., Sk} of S and there are
BT E E(S~) for all r E{1,..., k} such that B' -(~;-~ BT.
(iii) E is N-monotonic if for all S, S' E 2N with S C S', and all B E 2A, with
B E E(S) we have B E E(S').
(iv) E is superadditivc if for all S~, S2 E 2N, with S~ n S2 - Ql, aud all H~ E
B~ E E(S2), we have Bl n B2 E E(Sl U S2).
(v) E is upper cycle free if for all S~, ..., Sk E 2N with S~ n Si - 0
r,t E {1,...,k}, r~ t and all B1i...,Bk E 2A with Br E E(Sr)




3Clearly, if E is superadditive, then E is upper cycle free and N-monotonic, and
if E is A-monotonic, then E is weakly A-monotonic.
Now we define the superadditive cover E of an effectivity function E(Peleg 1984a).
Definition 2.3. Let E : 2N -a P(2A) be an effectivity function. The superadái-
tive cover E of E is a map tliat assigns to each S E 2N a subset of P(A) such that it
satisfies the following property: B E T(A) is an element of E(S) if and only if there
exist a partition {Sl, ..., Sk} of S and sets B, E E(S,) for all r E { 1, ..., k} such
that B - (~k-1 B,.
So, E is a function from 2N to P(P(A)). It is easy to see that E C E for a11
effectivity functions E, i.e. E(S) C É(S) for all S E 2N. It is clear that E is an
effectivity function (~ ~ E(S) for all S E 2N) if and only if F, is upper cycle free. The
name `superadditive cover' is explained in the next two lemma's.
Lemma 2.4. Let E: 2N --~ P(2A) be an effectivity function. The following three
properties are equivalent.
(i) E is upper cycle free.
(ii) E is a superadditive effectivity function.
(iii) There exists a superadditive effectivity function E' such that E C E'.
Proof. (i)~(ii) Let E be upper cycle free. Then by definition 0~ E(S) for all S E 2N.
Hence E is an effectivity function. Let S, T E 2N with S fl T- Vl and let B E E(S)
and D E E(T). Then there are partitions {Sl, ..., Sk } of S and {Ti, ..., T~ } of T
and there are Bl, ..., Bk and D~ ,..., Di with B, E E(S, ) for all r E{ 1, ..., k} and
D, E E(T,) for all s E{1, ...,!} such that B -(~f-1 B,. and D -(~;-1 D,. Then
{Sl, ..., Sk, Tl, ..., T~} is a partition of S U T and therefore by definition of É we
obtain B fl D E E(S U T). So E is superadditive.
(ii)~(iii) Trivial because E C É.
(iii)~(i) Let E' be a superadditive effectivity function such that E C E'. Since E'
4is superadditive, E' is upper cycle free. But then E is upper cycle free too because
E C E'. o
The following lemma shows that for an upper cycle free effectivity function E, É
is the smallest superadditive effectivity function containing E.
Lemma 2.5. Let E: 2N ~ P(2A) be an effectivity function. Theri for each su-
peradditive effectivity function E' with E C E' we have E C E C E'.
Proof. Let E' be a superadditive effectivity function such that E C F,'. Since E C E'
and E' is superadditive, it follows from lemma 2.4 that E is upper cycle free and
that E is superadditive. Let S E 2N and let B E E(S). Then there is a partition
{Sr,...,Sk} of S and there are Br,...,Bk with B, E E(S,.) for all r E{1,...,k}
such that B -(~~-r Br. Then by superadditivity of E' and E C E' it follows t}rat
B E E'(S). p
Let RN be a profile on A. The problem is, given all the preferences of the players,
to find an alternative, or a set of alternatives, which every player can agree upon.
One important solution concept is the core, defined (cf. Moulin and Peleg (1982))
as that subset of A, which consists of all `undominated' elements with respect to
the profile RN. Other solution concepts which assign to an effectivity function and a
profile a subset of alternatives are the nucleus (Holzman (1987)) and the supernucleus
(Fristrup and Keiding (1988)).
We will now modify the notion of the core in the sense that it will assign to an
effectivity function and a preference profile a collection of subsets of A rather than
orie subset. For this aim we first have to extend preference profiles on A to preference
profiles on 2A.
Definition 2.6. Let R be a preference relation on A. We define the exterrsiorr
R of R to 2A by: for all B, B' E 2" we have B' fi B if and only if
(i)forallb'EB'`Banda116EBwehaveb'Rb,
(ii)forallb'EB'andallbEB`B'wehaveó'R6.
5Furthermore, we define B' P B if and only if
(iii)forallb'EB'`BandallbEBwehaveb'Pb,
(iv)foralló'EB'andallbEB`B'wehaveb'P6.
We write Rs in stead of (R');ES and Ps in stead of (P');ES.
It readily follows that, if we restrict R to the singletons of 2A, then this restriction
can be identified with R by identifying a singleton with its unique element. Note that
R is also reflexive and transitive but it need not be complete. According to this defi-
nition B' E 2A is preferred to B E 2A if, in going from B to B', the elements added to
B (i.e. B'`B) are better than the ones already present, and the elements of B that
are dropped (i.e. B`B') are worse than the elements of B which are kept (i.e. Bf1 B').
Definition 2.7. Let E : 2N -~ P(2A) be an effectivity function and let RN be
a profile on A. Let B E 2A be a subset of alternatives. B is called an imputatáon of
E at R"' if
(i) B is individually rational, i.e. there do not exist i E N and B' E E({i}) such
that B' P' B, and
(ii) B is e,~tcient, i.e. there do not exist B' E 2A and i E N such that B' RN B
and B' P` B.
Frrrthermore, B is an element of the core of E at RN if there do not exist S E 2N,
i E S, and l3' E l;(S) such that !3' Rs B and l~' P' l~.
So a subset B of alternatives belongs to the core if there does not exist a coalition
S which is effective for another subset B' of alternatives that is weakly preferred to
B by all players of S and strictly preferred to B by at least one player in S. By
definition the imputation set contains the core.
63 Game correspondences and associated
effectivity functions
In this section we formally consider game correspondences and their associated ~-
and ~-effectivity functions. let S E 2N be a coalition. Let for all i E S, X; be
a non-empty set. We denote the Cartesian product jj;ES X; by Xs. If Q; E X;
for all i E S, then we write vs in stead of (a;);ES.
Definition 3.1. (cf. Peleg (1984b)) A game correspondence is an (n-~2)-tuple
G-(Xl, ..., X,,, A, a) where X; is a non-empty set of strategies for each i E N,
A is a finite set of alternatives, and ~ : Xrr -. 2A is non-imposed, i.e. for each a E A
there is a strategy oN :- (~1, . . . , ~„) E XN such that ~r(vn,) - {a }.
The interpretation of G is as follows: given the choice a; E X; of each player
i E N, the outcome multifunction ~r determines a non-empty subset ~r(oN) of alter-
natives.
This definition is almost similar to the definition of a game form introduced by
Gibbard (1973), where the map a is a surjective function froin XN to A. Moulin and
Peleg (1982) defined the a- and ,Q-effectivity functions associated with a game form.
Peleg (1984b) extended this definition to game correspondences.
Definition 3.2. Let G- (Xl, ..., Xn, A, ~r) be a game correspondence. The
a-effectivity funetion Eá and the ~i-effectivity function Ep associated with G are
defined as follows. Let S E 2N. Then
Eá(S):-{BE2A~~asEXstlrrr`sEX1v`s:
Ep(S) :- {B E 2A ~ b~r~r`s E XN`s 3os E Xs :
~(QS, rN`S) C B}
~(~S, rN`S) C B}.
Note that in defining the o- and ~3-effectivity functions associated with a game
form a(as, rN`s) C B changes in a(os, rN`s) E B.
7The reader can easily verify that Etr and Ep are indeed effectivity functions (since
a is non-imposed) and that Eá(S) C Ep(S) for all S E 2N and all game correspon-
dences G. A game correspondence G is called tight if Eá - Eá. Furthermore, it is
easy to see that for every garne correspondence G, Etr and Ep are both N-monotonic
and A-monotonic and that Eá is superadditive.
Some solution concepts for game correspondences at a given profile are recalled in
Definition 3.3. Let G be a game correspondence and RN a profile. A strategy
vector QN E XN is a Nash equilibríum of G at RN if there do not exist i E N and
r, E X; such that a(vN~{;}, ,) P` ~r(oN). A Nash equilibrium o-N is Pareto undom-
inated if there do not exist rN E XN and i E N such that a(rN) RN ~r(o~v) and
~r(rN) P' n(o1v). Further, aN is called a strong Nash equilibrium of (G, RN) if there
do not exist S E 2N, i E S and rs E XS such that a(QN`S, rs) RS ~r(vN) and
~(QN`SiTS) P~ ~(~N)-
Clearly, each strong Nash equilibrium is Pareto undominated.
4 Implementation results
This section shows how for an upper cycle free effectivity function E, one can con-
struct a game correspondence G(E) such that G(E) is tight and E C Eá~El. 'I'he
game correspondence G(E) is called the claim game correspondence associated with
E. We provide necessary and suf6cient conditions on E such that E- Eá~El. Fi-
nally, this section establishes relationships between imputations and core elemeuts
of E at a preference profile RN and Pareto undominated Nash equilibria and strong
Nash equilibria of the claim game correspondence G(E) at RN, respectively.
Definition 4.1. Let E : 2N ~~(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function. The
claim game correspondence G(E) associated with E is given by
G(E) -(Xr, ..., X,,, A, x) where for each i E N
8X;:-{(S,B)E2Nx2A~iES, BEE(S)},
and for QN -(S;, B;);EN E XN, a(oN) is defined by
~(~{B E 2" ~ B E F(Q~,)} if F(oN) ~ 0
A if F(QN) - 0.
Here F: XN -~ 2A is defined as follows. For oN E XN
F(vN) :- {B E 2A ~~S E 2N[B E E(S)], di E S[~; -(S,B)]}.
Note that ~r(a~r) ~~ for all aN E XN because E is upper cycle free.
In the claim game correspondence G(E) the strategy (S;, B;) of player i E N can
be interpreted as a claim in the following way. Player i wants to form coalition S; ~ i
and he wants the final outcome to be in a subset B; of alternatives for which S; is
effective. According to the outcome function ~r, the final outcome will certainly be in
B; if all the players in S; have exactly the same claims.
Example 4.2. Let N- { 1, 2, 3, 4} and A- {ao, al, a2, a3, a4, as}.
Define E: 2N -i P(2A) by
E({1}) - { {ao,a9}, {a~,a2ia4}, A}, E({1,2}) - { {al,a2ias}, A},
E({2, 3}) - {{ao, al, a2i as}, A}, E({3, 4}) -{ {a1, a3, a~}, A},
E(N) - 2", and E(S) -{A} else.
Then E is upper cycle free, so G(E) -(X~, ..., X,,, A, ar) is well-defined.
Note that E is not superadditive. Define the strategy QN E XN by ol - ({ 1}, {ao, a4 }),
~s - 03 - ({2,3},{ao,al,a2,as}), Q4 - ({3,4},{ai,aa,aa})-
Then F(aN) - { {ao,a4}, {ao,ai,a2,as}} and therefore,
~r(QN) - {ao, a4} fl {ao, al, a2i as} -{ao}.
Tightness of claim game correspondences associated with upper cycle free effec-
tivity functions follows from
Proposition 4.3. Let the effectivity function E : 2~" --~ P(2A) be upper cycle
frc~c. 'I'hen
9E C EáIE~ - Ep~E~.
Proof. Let S E 2N and B E E(S). Define o-s E Xs by o-; :- (S, B) for all i E S.
Then for all rN`s E XN`s we have B E F(os, r~r`s). Hence, ~r(as, rN`s) C B for all
rN`s E XN`s. Hence, B E EQ1El (S).
To prove tightness of G(E) it suffices to show that Ep~EI(S) C Eá~EI(S) for all
S E 2N. Let S E 2N and B E Ep1El(S). Define T~,`s E XN`s by T; :- ({i}, A) for all
i E N`S. Since B E EpIE~(S), there is a as E Xs such that n(os, TN`s) C B. Hence,
(~{ U E 2~ ~ D E l~'(as, rN`ti)} C B. Recausc ( F(os, rN`S)`{A}) C I'(as, rN`s) for
all rN`s E XN`s, we obtain (~{D E 2A ~ D E F(os,rN`s)} C B for all r~,`s E XN`s.
Hence, B E Etr lEl(S). o
The next proposition shows the importance of the condition of upper cycle free-
ness.
Proposition 4.4. Let E : 2N -~ ~(2A) be an effectivity function. There exists
a game correspondence G such that E C Eá if and only if E is upper cycle free.
Proof. (~) Since Eá is superadditive this follows immediately from lemma 2.4.
(G) Follows immediately from proposition 4.3. ~
Theorem 4.6 below characterizes the properties an effectivity function E must satisfy
for coincidence of E and Etr~El. For this we need the monotonicity result of
Lemma 4.5. Let E and E' be upper cycle free effectivity functions and let
G(E) -(X~, ..., X,,, A, ~r) and G(E') -(Xi, ..., X;,, A, ~r') be the associated claim
game correspondences. If E C E' then Eá~EI C Eá~E~l
Proof. Let B E EtrlEl(S) for some S E 2N. If B- A, then B E Eá~E~l (S). Suppose
f3 ~ A. 'There is a strategy os - (S;, B:);es E Xs such that ~r(O's, rN`s) C B for
all r~r`s E X~,`s. Take rN`s E XN`s such that r; -({i}, A) for all i E X~r`s. Let
Sa :- {i E S ~~j E S;[S~ ~ S; or B~ ~ B;)}. Since a(as,rN`s) C B~ A, we
have So ~ S and there is a partition {Si ,..., Sk } of S`So and B; E E(S; ) for all
r E{1,...,k} such that (S;,B;) -(S;,B;) for all i E S; and all r E{1,...,k}
10and (~;-1 B~ C B. Since os E XS, and B~ E F(vs, TN`s) for r E{ 1, ..., k} and all
rN`s E XN`s, we obtain ~r'(os, rN`S) C B for all rN`s E X~,`s. So B E E~IE~I(S). O
Theorem 4.6. Let E: 2N -a P(2~) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Then
(i) Ep(E, - Ea(E) - Ea(E) - E(~(E)
(ii) É- EáIE~ if and only if E is A-monotonic
(iii) E- Eá~E~ if and only if E is A-monotonic and superadditive.
Proof. (i) Because of proposition 4.3 it suffices to prove that Etr~E~ - Eá~E~.
(C) follows by lemma 4.5.
(~) Let G(E) :- (Xl, . . . , X,,, A, ~r) and G(É) :- (Xl, . . . , X,,, A, ~).
Let S E 2N and B E Eá~El (S). If B- A, then B E Eá~El(S). Suppose B~ A.
Then there is a ós E Xs such that ir(ós,TN`s) C B for all TN`s E X N`s. Take
TN`S E XN`s such that T; -({i},A) for all i E N`S. As in the proof of lemma
4.5, since ir(ós,TN`s) C B one can find disjoint subcoalitions Sl, ..., Sk of S and
B, E É(S,.) for all r E { 1, . .., k} such that v; - (S„Br ) for all i E S, and
r E{ 1, ..., k}, and (~T-~ Br C B. For all r E{1, ..., k} by definition of É, there
are partitions {Srl, ..., S,k, } of S, and there are Bf, E E(S„) for all s E{ 1, ..., kr }
such that Br - ~a-1 Brs-
Define Qs E Xs by o; :- (S,,,Br,) for all i E 5,,, s E {1,...,k,} and r E{1,...,k}.
Then B„ E F(os, rN`s) for all s E{ 1, ..., kr }, r E { 1, . .., k} and T,v`s E XN`s.
Since B~(~-~ B, -(~-~ (~s-1 B,s we obtain a(os, TN`s) C B for all T~r`s E XN`s-
Hence, B E Eá~El (S).
(ii) (G) Suppose E is A-monotonic. By proposition 4.3 it is sufficient to prove that
É~ Eá~E~. Therefore, let S E 2N and B E EQ~El(S). If B- A, then B E É(S).
Suppose B~ A. Then there exists a ós E Xs such that ~(ás,TN`s) C B for all
TN`s E XN`s. Take TN`s E XN`s such that T; -({i}, A) for all i E N`S.
Siuce ~r(ás,TN`s) C B, one can find disjoint subsets 51,...,Sk of S and B, E E(S,)
for all r E{ 1, ..., k} such that ~(vs, r~r`s) -(~;-1 Br. Since E is superadditive, we
obtain (~T-1 Br E E(U;-1 S,). Since E is superadditive and hence N-monotonic, this
11implies (~T-1 B, E E(S). Hence, since E is A-monotonic and (~;-1 Br C B it follows
that B E É(S).
(~) Suppose E- Eá~~~~. '1'hen E is A-monotonic since Ea~E~ is A-monotonic.
(iii) (G) If E is superadditive, then E- É by lemma 2.5. Using A-monotonicity (i)
and (ii) imply that E- Eá~El
(~) Suppose E- EálEl. By lemma 2.5 É- EálEl - E. So, in particular, E is
superadditive, and from (i) and (ii) it follows that E is A-monotonic. O
Lemma 4.7. Let E : 2N --~ P(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Then E is weakly A-monotonic if and only if E is A-monotonic.
Proof. (~) Let E be weakly A-monotonic. Let B, B' E 2A with B C B' and suppose
B E E(S) for some S E 2N. We prove that B' E E(S). Since B E E(S), there is
a partition {Sl, ..., Sk} of S and there are Br E E(ST) for all r E{1, ..., k} such
that B - (~k-1 B,. Define BT :- B, U B' for all r E{ 1, ..., k}. Then Br C B; for all
r E{ 1, ..., k} and (~T-~ Br - B'. E is weakly A-monotonic, so for each r E{ 1, ..., k}
there exist a partition { S.i, ..., S,k, } of S, and B;, E E(Sr, ) for all s E { 1, ..., kr }
such that BT - 1 Is-1 Bf,. But then {Sr, I 3 E {1, . .., k, }, r E{ 1, ..., k}} IS a
partition of S, and since BT, E E(Sr,) for all s E{1, ... , k, } and r E{ 1, ..., k}, we
obtain by definition of E, that B' - (~;-1(~;-1 B;, E E(S). So E is A-monotonic.
(~) Let E be A-monotonic. Let B, B' E 2A with B C B' and suppose B E E(S)
for some S E 2N. Since E is A-monotonic and E C E, we have B' E E(S). Hence,
there is a partition {Sl, ..., Sk} of S and there are BT E E(Sr) for all r E{ 1, ..., k}
such that B' -(~;-~ B;. So E is weakly A-monotonic. ~
Corollary 4.8. Let E : 2N --~ P(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Then É- Eá~El if and only if E is weakly A-monotonic.
In the last part of this section we examine relations between solution concepts
of effectivity functions at a profile RN and solution concepts of the associated claim
game correspondence at RN. First we show that the set of imputations corresponds
to the set of outcomes of the Pareto undominated Nash equilibria.
12Theorem 4.9. Let E: 2N -. ~(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function
and let RN be a profile on A. Let G(E) :- (Xl, ..., X,,, A, a) be the associated claim
game correspondence. Let B E 2A. Then
B is an imputation of E at RN if and only if there exists a Pareto undominated
Nash equilibrium vN of G(E) at RN such that a(vN) - B.
Proof. (~). Let B be an imputation of E at RN.
Define oN E XN by o; :- (N, B) for all i E N. Then a(QN) - B. We prove that
oN is a Pareto undominated Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN. Suppose there ex-
ist rN E X,v and i E N such that ~r(rN) RN ~r(o~,) and ~r(rN) P' ~r(v~„). Define
B' :- ~r(r~,). Then B' RN B and B' P' B, which leads to a contradiction since B
is efI'icient. Hence, oN is Pareto undominated. Suppose that there are i E N and
r; E X; such that ~r(r;,oN`{;}) P` ~r(aN). If r -({i},B;) for some B; E E({i}),
then ~r(r„oN`{;}) - B;. However, this would imply B; P' B which contradicts the
fact that B is individually rational. For every other possible choice of r; ~ a; we
have ~r(r;, aN`{;}) - A. Then however, A P` B which is in contradiction with the
individually rationality of B.
Hence, vN is a Pareto undominated Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN.
(~) Let aN be a Pareto undominated Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN.
Define B:- ~r(QN). We have to prove that B is efficient and individually rational.
Suppose that B is not efficient. Then there are B' E 2A and i E N such that B' RN B
ancí B' P` B. Define rN E XN by r-(N,B') for all i E N. Then ~r(rN) - B' and
we obtain a contradiction since aN is Pareto undominated. It remains to prove that
B is individually rational. Suppose there exist i E N and B' E E({i}) such that
B' P' B. Define , E X; by r, :- ({i}, B'). Then a(r;,oN`{;}) C B' and since B' P' B
we obtain by definition of P' that ~(r;,oN`{;}) P` B.
This leads to a contradiction since oN is a Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN. ~
We can also prove a relation between the core and the set of strong Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.10. Let E: 2N -~ P(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function
13and RN a profile on A. Let G(E) :- (Xr, ..., X,,, A, rr) be the associated claim game
correspondence. Then the following two assertions hold.
(i) If ~N is a strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN, then ~r(aN) is a core element
of (' aL 1R~`'.
(ii) In case E is superadditive, then for each core element B of E at RN there exists
a strong Nash equilibrium vN of G(E) at RN such that ~r(QN) - B.
Proof. (i) Let aN E X~, be a strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN. Define
B:- ~r(aN). Suppose there are S E 2N, i E S and B' E E(S) such that B' Rs B
and B' P' B. Define rs E Xs by r; :- (S, B') for all i E S. Then ~r(rs, atv`s) C B'
and by definition of R` it follows that rr(rs, o~r`s) Rs B and ~r(rs, aN`s) P' B. This
leads to a contradiction since oN is a strong Nash equilibrium of G(E) at Rl".
(ii) Let E be superadditive and let B be a core element of E at RN. Define oN E XN
by o; :- (N, B) for all i E N. Then ~r(o~,) - B. Suppose that oN is not a strong
Nash equilibrium of G(E) at RN. Then there exist S E 2N, i E S, and rs E Xs such
that ~r(rs, ~N`s) Rs rr(aN) and ~r(rs, anr`s) P' ~r(oN). Hence, a(rs,v~,`s) ~ A and
there are disjoint subsets Sr, ..., Sk of S and Br E E(S, ) for all r E { 1, . .., k} such
that r~ -(S„B,) for all j E S, and all r E{1,...,k}, and a(rs,~x`s) - ÏÍ;-i B.-
Since E is superadditive, we have (~T-r B, E E(U;-r S,.) C E(S). This leads to a
contradiction since B is a core element of E at RN. o
It may be noted that Borm and Peters (1991) proved coincidence of the sets of
coalition proof Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria of a strategic claim game
corresponding to ari NTU-game. Example 4.12 shows that this is not the case in the
context of claim game correspondences associated to an effectivity function.
Definition 4.11.(cf. 13ernheim, Peleg, Whinston (1987)). Let G:- (X~, .. ., X,,, A, a)
be a game corresponderice and RN a profile on A. Let S E 2N and aN E XN. An
internally consistent improvement of S on o~r at RN is defined inductively as follows:
(i) if ~ S ~- 1, that is S-{i} for some i E N, then r, E X; is an internally consistent
improvement upon o-N at RN if rr(r;,oN`;) P' a(QN).
14(ii) if ~ S ~1 1, then Ts E Xs is an internally consistent improvement upon a~v at RN
if
(a) n(rs, aN`s) Rs ~r(oN) and there exists an i E S such that ~r(rs, ~~v`s) P' ~(~rv),
and
(b) if T C S and T~ S then T has no internally consistent improvement upon
(T.,,~N`s) at, fiN.
oN E X~r is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium of G at RN if no coalition S E 2N has
an internally consistent improvement upon QN at RN.
Example 4.12. Consider again example 4.2. Define the preference profile
RN -(R', R~, R3, Rq) on A by
R' - ao az ai aa aq as,
s-
R - a2 a1 a3 a4 a5 ao,
R3 - a2 a3 al aq a5 aU,
fL- - ag 4~ a2 (Lq as ap.
Here there are no indifferences and the preferences of the players are denoted in de-
creasing order, i.e. player 1 likes ao the most, then a2i etc. Now define Qr, E X~r
by al - 02 -({1,2},{al,aZ,as}), and Q3 - aq -({3,4},{al,a3,aq}). Then
~r(aN) - {a~}. It can be verified that the only coalition that has an improveinent
upon oN is S-{ 1, 2, 3}, namely define rs E Xs by r1 -({ 1},{al, a2, aq} ), and
r2 - r3 -({2,3},{ao,a~,a~,a5}). Then ~r(as,TN`s) - {a~,a2} and {a~,a2} Ps {a~}.
But rs is not internally consistent because player 1 can deviate successfully: define
~1 E X~ by ~~ -( {1}, {ao, aq}). Then ~r(~i, TZ, Tg, oq) -{ao} and {ao} P' {al, a2}.
The conclusion is that o~, is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium but not a strong Nash
equilibrium.
5 Towards game forms
In definition 4.1 every upper cycle free effectivity function E is associated with a claim
game correspondence G(E) -(Xl, ..., X,,, A, a). Here ~r is a correspondence from
15XN to A. In this section we derive a claim game form H(E) -(Xl, ..., X,,, A, p)
from G(E), where p is a surjective function from Xrr to A. Moreover, this is done in
such a way that EQ~El - Eá~El
Moulin (1983) already describes a process to go from a game correspondence G to
a game form H such that Eá - Eá, but his construction only works for a finite set
of alternatives, while the construction described in this section can also be applied to
an infinite set of alternatives. As a result this section yields an alternative proof of
Theorem 5.1. (Moulin (1983)) Let E be an effectivity function. '1'hen there exists a
game form H such that Eá - E if and only if E is superadditive and A-monotonic.
An obvious way to go from a game correspondence to a game form is by means
of a choice function.
Lemma 5.2. Let C : 2A -~ A be a`choice íunction', i.e. C(B) E B for all B E 2A.Let
G-(Xl, ..., X,,, A, x) be a game correspondence. Define p- Co~r. Then
(i) H-(Xl, ..., X,,, A, p) is a game form
(ii) Ery C Eá and Ep C Ep.
Proof. (i) the surjectiveness of p follows from the non-imposedness of ~.
(ii) Let S E 2N and B E 2A and suppose B E Etr(S). Then there exists a strategy
~s E Xy such that a(as, rN`5) C B for all T~r`S E XN`S. But thcn Co~r(as, Tnr`s) E B
for aII T~r`s E XN`s. Ileucc L~ E Lv~(S).
The proof of the second assertion is similar. O
However, in general the inclusions in lemma 5.2 (ii) need not be equalities, not
even if G is a claim game correspondence. The following example shows that there
are claim game correspondences such that for every choice function these inclusions
are not eyualities.
16Example 5.3. Let N- { l, 2}, A- {a, b}, and define the efCectivity function
E: 2N --~ P(2A) as follows. E({1}) - E({2}) - {A}, and E(N) - 2A. Then
G(E) -(XI, Xzi A, ~r), where for all i E N
X; -{({i}, A)} U {(N, B) ~ B E 2A} and for all o~, E X~,
{a} if or - QZ - (N, {a})
a(oN) - {b} if ar - v2 - (N, {b})
A otherwise.
Let C : 2A ~ A be a choice function. W.l.o.g. suppose C(A) -{a}. Let p :- Coa
and H(E) :- (Xl, Xzi A, p). Then
{A} - Ep1El({i}) - EálEl({i}) ~ EálEl({i}) - EáIEI({i}) -{{a},A} for all
iEN.
In order to establish an equality between EáIEl and EbIEl for some game form
H(E) derived from G(E), we have to go beyond the scope of choice functions. In
particular, p(Q~r) will have to depend more directly on aN itself, not only on a(aN).
Definition 5.4 Let C: 2A -~ A be a choice function. For each B E 2A define a
surjection hB frorn A to B such that
6 ifbEB
há(b) :-
C(B) if b E A`B.
Let Ó: 2" x 2A -~ 2A be a binary operation on the non-empty subsets of A defined
for all B, D E lA as follows.
B ifB-D
BÓD :-
(B`D) U (D`B) if B ~ D.
If B~ D, then B~D is the symmetric difference between B and D. Let B, D E 2A
with B~ D. Note that (BÓB)~D - B~D and that B~(B~D) - D. So, ~ is not
associative. In order to avoid parentheses it is necessary to define in which order a
scqucnc,e of t1 opcrations hati to bc evaluated. let D~, ..., Dk bc eleinents of 2A. ~l'hcn
by D1ÓDZ~D3 is meant (Dr~D~)~D3 and for all 3 G t C k by D1~Dz ... ~Dt is
meant (Dr ... ~D~-r )~Dt. So, the evaluation of DrOD~ ... ~D~ is from left to right.
17Proposition 5.5. Let 2 G k and 1 G t C k. Let Di, ..., Dk be elements of 2A.
'1'hen {D, . . . ~Di-10BáDifl . . . ~D~ ( B E 2A} - 2A.
Proof. Let D, D' E 2A. Then there is a B E 2" such that DÓB - D': if D- D',
then take B- D, else take B- D~D'.
So,{D~B~BE2A}-{BOD~BE2~}-2A.
Consequently, {D~ ...ODt-1~B ~ B E 2~} - 2A.
Hence, {D, ...ÓDi-,~BÓDt~, ~ B E 2A} -{P~Dtt, ~ P E 2A} - 2A.
Hence, {Dl ...ÓDt-10B~Di}iÓDt}2 ~ B E 2A} -{P~Dt}2 ~ P E 2A} - 2A.
Repetition of this argument yields that
{D, ... ~D,-,~B~D~t, ...ÓDk ~ B E 2"} - 2A. o
Now we are able to define a claim game form derived from a claim game corre-
spondence.
Definition 5.6. Let G(E) -(X~,...,X„A,~r) be a claim game correspondc~nce
associated with an upper cycle free effectivity function E. Let C: 2~ -. A be a
choice function and let {hB ~ B E 2A} as in definition 5.4.
Define ,fB: X~r --~ 2A as follows.
For aN -(S;, B;);EN E XN, fE(~N) :- Bl ... OB,,. Then the claim game form
H(E) :- (X1,...,X„A, p) corresponding to G(E) and C is defined by
p(~N) :- h~ox)(C.ofE(~N))
for all aN E XN. Clearly, p(o~r) E n(o~r) for all Q~r E XN. So by non-imposedness of
a it follows that p is surjective.
We now show that the a-effectivity functions of C(E) and H(E) coincide for every
upper cycle free effectivity function E.
Theorem 5.7. Let E : 2N --~ P(2A) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Let G(E) -(X~, ..., X,,, A, ~r) be the claim game correspondence associated with E,
and let H(E) -(Xl, ..., X,,, A, ~r) be the claitn game form corresponding to G(E)
18and a choice function C. Then
EC~E) - EH~EI. 0 0
Proof. As in the proof of lemma 5.2(ii) one can show that Eá~E) C Eó~E). It remains
to prove that Eb~E)(S) ~ Eá~E)(S) for all S E 2N. Let S E 2N and B E Eá~E)(S).
We have to prove that B E Eá~E)(S). This is obvious if B - A or if S- N. There-
fore, suppose B~ A and S~ N. Since B E EálE)(S), there is a strategy os E XS
such that for all TN`s E XN`s we have p(os,TN`s) E B.
Claim: For each D E 2A there is an i E S such that a; ~(N, D).
Proof of the claim: Let D E 2A. Suppose for all i E S Q; -(N, D). Take
a E A`B. By proposition 5.5 it follows that there are D~ E 2A, j E N`S such
that D~~DZ ... ~D„ -{a}, where for ease of notation D; - D if i E S. Let
r; -(N, D~) for all j E N`S. Then




If D~ - D for all j E N`S, then {a} - D0D ... ~D - D and a(QS, TN`s) - D.
However, this would imply that p(as,rN`s) - a~ B.
So, there is a j E N`S such that D~ ~ D. Hence, ~r(~s,TN`s) - A and again
P(os,rN`s) - a~ B. So, there is no D E 2A such that for all i E S we have
o-; -(N, D), and this proves the claim.
Fix i E N`S. For each D E 2A, consider the strategy vector rN`s E XN`s defined by
rD -(N, D) and ro -(N, A) for all j E N`(S U{i}). Then it follows that there
exists a Z E 2A such that for all D E 2A ~r(O's, TN`s) - Z.
By definition p(os,rN`s) - hZ(CofE(os,rN`s)). By proposition 5.5 we have that
{fE(as, TN`s) I D E 2" }- 2A and therefore, {p(os, TN`s) I D E 2A }- Z. Since
P(~s,TN`s) E B for all D E 2A, we have ~(as,TN`s) - Z C B for all D E 2A.
But then it readily follows that ~r(QS, rN`s) C B for all rN`s E X~,`s. Hence,
B E Eá~E)(S). O
Corollary 5.8. Let E : 2N --~ ~(2~) be an upper cycle free effectivity function.
Tlien there exists a game form H such that EQ - E if and only E is superadditive
and A-monotonic.
Proof. Combine theorem 4.6 and theorem 5.7. O
19Example 5.9. Consider again example 5.3. Applying theorem 5.7 yields that
p(o~r) - b if al - 02 -(N, {b}) or if ol -(N, {a}) and Q~ E {(N, A), ({2}, A)}
or if oz -(N, {a}) and o~ E{(N, A),({1},A)} and in all other cases p(o~r) - a.
Now it follows that EáIEi({1}) - EálEl({2}) -{{a},A}. Moreover, since E is not
maximal (cf. Moulin and Peleg (1982)), it follows that there is no game form H such
that Ep - E.
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